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TAXATION: SOME GUIDELINES FOR STRUCTURING
TRANSACTIONS
GARY G. BELKIN*
Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low
as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay
the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes.'
Inasmuch as taxpayers may plan their business transactions so as
to minimize their federal tax liability, doing so often requires advice
which reflects the most recent law on the subject. Thus, it is incumbent
upon the tax practitioner to be familiar not only with the Internal Rev-
enue Code,2 but also with the most recent judicial pronouncements in
this regard. The purpose of this article is to summarize the work of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit during the pe-
riod June 1, 1979 to May 31, 1980 and to analyze some of the reported
tax decisions3 in terms of their implications for structuring transac-
tions.
4
* . Attorney, Sears, Roebuck and Co.; J.D., University of Illinois; member of Illinois Bar.
1. Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), ail'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). This
quote from an opinion written by Judge Learned Hand is often cited to support the proposition
that a taxpayer may, within the purview of the law, plan transactions so as to result in the least
amount of tax. See, e.g., Grove v. Commissioner, 490 F.2d 241, 242 (2d Cir. 1973).
2. Hereinafter referred to as the Code.
3. Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, Nos. 79-1602, 79-1603 (7th Cir. April 29, 1980);
Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980); Ransburg Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Com-
missioner, 621 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1980); First Trust & Sav. Bank of Taylorville v. Commissioner,
614 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1980); Hope School v. United States, 612 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1980); Carle
Foundation v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W.
3120 (U.S. April 30, 1980) (No. 79-1721); Sgro v. United States, 609 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1979);
Falkoff v. Commissioner, 604 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1979); Quarrie Charitable Fund v. Commis-
sioner, 603 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1979).
4. To review the Seventh Circuit's handling of other issues, see Holcomb v. United States,
622 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1980) (involving civil penalty for failure to pay withholding taxes); Chal-
lenger v. Local 1, Int'l Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Ironworkers, 619 F.2d 645 (7th Cir.
1980) (involving ERISA); Johnson v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1980) (involving im-
proper interpretation of informal Internal Revenue Service publication); Rohrabaugh v. Commis-
sioner, 611 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1979) (involving civil penalty for late filing of an estate tax return);
United States v. Balistrieri, 606 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1850 (1980)
(involving procedure in criminal case); Fremont v. McGraw-Edison Co., 606 F.2d 752 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1599 (1980) (involving ERISA); United States v. Falk, 605 F.2d
1005 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1079 (1980) (involving procedure in criminal case);
United States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1338 (1980) (involv-
ing procedure in criminal case); United States v. Baron, 602 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 967 (1980) (involving procedure in criminal case); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Rosewell, 604
F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1310 (1980) (involving right to interest on refund
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This article will first discuss two cases in which the court was
called upon to determine whether alleged business purposes were suffi-
cient to sustain transactions clearly motivated by tax avoidance. 5 Sec-
ond, a case involving the priority of a federal tax lien will be
considered. 6 Third, a decision regarding imputed interest on the in-
stallment sale of a patent will be examined. 7 Fourth, two cases dealing
with taxation of unrelated business income of tax-exempt organizations
will be reviewed. 8 Fifth, a decision concerning private foundation sta-
tus of a charitable fund will be discussed. 9 Finally, two cases involving
application of the "tax benefit rule" will be reviewed.'
0
SUFFICIENCY OF BUSINESS PURPOSE
Although a taxpayer may plan transactions so as to minimize
taxes, a transaction must have a purpose other than tax avoidance to be
recognized for tax purposes."I Courts must often determine whether a
transaction is supported by a valid purpose. Two cases 12 reported by
the Seventh Circuit during the period June 1, 1979 to May 31, 1980
involved a determination of whether valid business purposes existed in
transactions prompted by tax avoidance. In both instances the court
found in favor of the taxpayer.'
3
of real estate taxes); United States v. Carter, 602 F.2d 799 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
967 (1980) (involving procedure in criminal case); United States v. McDonough, 603 F.2d 19 (7th
Cir. 1979) (involving criminal sanctions for making false withholding claims); United States v.
Moll, 602 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1979) (involving application of attorney-client privilege to records of
taxpayer's accountant held by his attorney and issuance of an Internal Revenue Service summons
in a criminal case); United States v. Stout, 601 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979
(1980) (involving criminal prosecution of a tax protestor); Garsky v. United States, 600 F.2d 86
(7th Cir. 1979) (involving civil penalty for failure to pay withholding taxes).
5. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980); Falkoffv. Commissioner, 604
F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 11-66 infra.
6. Sgro v. United States, 609 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 67-82
infra.
7. Ransburg Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1980). See text
accompanying notes 83-95 infra.
8. Hope School v. United States, 612 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1980); Carle Foundation v. United
States, 611 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1979),pedihonfor cert. fled, 49 U.S.L.W. 3120 (U.S. April 30, 1980)
(No. 79-1721). See text accompanying notes 96-123 infra.
9. Quarrie Charitable Fund v. Commissioner, 603 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1979). See text ac-
companying notes 124-141 infra.
10. First Trust & Sav. Bank of Taylorville v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1980);
Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, Nos. 79-1602, 79-1603 (7th Cir. April 29, 1980). See text
accompanying notes 142-179 infra.
11. The leading case frequently cited for this requirement is Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S.
465 (1935).
12. Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980); Falkoff v. Commissioner, 604
F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1979).
13. Although the taxpayers prevailed in Foglesong and Falkoff, both cases were remanded.
In Foglesong the case was remanded to the Tax Court for determination of an issue not previously
TAXA TION
Characterizing a Corporate Distribution as a Return of Capital
In Falkoff v. Commissioner,'4 a case which at first blush presents a
surprising result, the Seventh Circuit held that a $10 million distribu-
tion from a corporation to a partnership, its sole shareholder, consti-
tuted a return of capital rather than a dividend.' 5 In reaching its
decision, the Seventh Circuit appears to have given substantial weight
to the premise that a taxpayer may plan transactions so as to result in
the least amount of tax. Thus, although the Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged that the transaction was motivated by tax avoidance purposes, it
noted that "[t]he taxpayer's purpose to avoid taxation alone does not
provide a sufficient basis for reshaping the transaction to change its tax
repercussions." '
6
Falkoff involved a rather complicated series of financial transac-
tions. The corporation, which filed a consolidated income tax return
with its subsidiaries, had no accrued earnings and profits as of Septem-
ber 30, 1969, the last day of its fiscal year.17 A wholly-owned subsidi-
ary had negotiated but not finalized the sale of a parcel of real estate.' 8
If the sale had been completed by September 30, 1969, the sale would
have generated earnings and profits so that a distribution to the part-
nership would have been taxed as a dividend. 19
A plan was devised whereby the corporation would make a distri-
bution to the partnership prior to September 30, 1969, in anticipation of
the forthcoming sale of real estate. On September 29, the corporation
borrowed $18 million from the First National Bank of Chicago.20 The
corporation transferred $17.5 million of the loan proceeds to the part-
nership, characterizing $7.5 million as payment of an existing debt and
the remaining $10 million as a return of capital. The partnership used
examined by the Tax Court. 621 F.2d at 873. See text accompanying note 51 infra. Falkoff was
remanded for determination as to the plaintiffs basis in the corporate stock it owned. This factual
determination, however, did not go to the main issue of the case. 604 F.2d at 1052.
14. 604 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1979).
15. Id If the distribution had been characterized as a dividend, it would have been taxable
to the shareholder as ordinary income. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7), 301(c)(l).
As a return of capital, the distribution reduces the shareholder's basis in the stock and, to the
extent the distribution exceeds that basis, it is taxed as a capital gain from the sale of stock. I.R.C.
§§ 301(c)(2)-(3)(A), 1221-1222.
16. 604 F.2d at 1048. But see note 23 infra.
17. Id at 1046-47.
18. Id at 1047. The property, located in Contra Costa County, California, was sold for
$12,250,000 and was reported as an $11,002,410 long-term capital gain in the corporation's consol-
idated income tax return for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1970. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 417, 418
(1977).
19. A distribution of property made by a corporation to its shareholders is a dividend to the
extent of its current or accumulated earnings and profits. I.R.C. § 316(a).
20. Hereinafter referred to as the Bank.
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$15.5 million of the funds to repay the bulk of a debt obligation to the
Bank. The real estate sale was completed by October 2, 1969, which
was in the following fiscal year. After the sale was completed, the sub-
sidiary transferred $10 million to the corporation, which used the
money to pay off part of its September 29 loan.
21
The Commissioner contended that these events were merely steps
in a single transaction, 22 that the plan lacked substance 23 and that the
distribution to the partnership constituted a constructive dividend 24 to
the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits for the fiscal year
ended September 30, 1970.25 Although the Tax Court held in favor of
the Commissioner, 26 it apparently disagreed with the step transaction
approach. The court regarded the $18 million loan to the corporation
as equivalent to a nonrecourse loan to the partnership inasmuch as the
partnership's stock in the corporation was pledged as collateral for the
loan. 27 Relying upon Gross v. Commissioner,28 the Tax Court acknowl-
edged the right of a corporation to pay a dividend out of borrowed
funds based upon appreciated assets. The court, however, regarded a
distribution from funds supplied by the shareholders through a bank
loan as an exception to the Gross rule. The distribution was considered
as having neither a business purpose nor economic substance.
29
The Tax Court considered the repayment of the bank loan by the
corporation in the following fiscal year as a payment of the partner-
ship's debt. As such, the loan repayment was treated as a constructive
payment to the partnership taxable to the extent of the corporation's
earnings and profits for its fiscal year ended September 30, 1970.
30
21. 604 F.2d at 1047.
22. Id Under the judicially established step transaction doctrine, where a series of separate
transactions is considered as integrated parts of a single plan, for tax purposes they are treated as a
single transaction. This will result in a different income tax treatment than if each step were
treated independently of the others. For a general discussion of the step transaction doctrine see
R. PAUL & P. ZIMET, STEP TRANSACTIONS, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (2d ser.
1938).
23. 604 F.2d at 1047. The Commissioner argued that there was no business purpose for the
September 29 loan to the corporation. Id A transaction must have some purpose other than tax
avoidance if it is to be recognized for tax purposes. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935).
24. Although a formal dividend is not declared by a corporation, a distribution to a share-
holder in his capacity as such may be treated as a dividend regardless of the form of the distribu-
tion. For a general discussion of constructive dividends see B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 7.05 (4th ed. 1979).
25. 604 F.2d at 1047.
26. Falkoffv. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 417 (1976).
27. Id. at 422.
28. 23 T.C. 756 (1955), ag'd, 236 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1956).
29. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 422.
30. Id at 423.
TAXATION
The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit was to determine what
it considered to be the "economic reality of the transaction." 3 1 In re-
jecting the finding of the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the pledge of stock did not cause the Bank to look to the partnership for
satisfaction of the debt obligation and that the loan had, in fact, been
made to the corporation. The court stated that the stock only repre-
sented the underlying value of the corporation's assets and that ade-
quate security could have been obtained through a mortgage of those
assets. The value of the pledged collateral for the $18 million loan was
over $30 million, of which approximately $24 million was put up di-
rectly by the corporation.32 The Seventh Circuit also concluded that
the transaction, which resulted in payment of a $7.5 million debt and a
$10 million reduction in the net worth of the corporation, had eco-
nomic substance.
33
The court went on to state that even if the loan were a sham, the
Tax Court finding would be incorrect in that the transaction occurred
in the fiscal year ended September 30, 1969, when the corporation had
no earnings and profits. 34 The Seventh Circuit focused on the date the
partnership paid its direct obligation to the Bank. It would seem, how-
ever, that if the September 29 Bank loan had in fact been for the benefit
of the partnership, perhaps the relevant date should be the date of re-
payment of the September 29 loan.
35
Although the decision in Falkoff analyzed what the Seventh Cir-
cuit considered to be the "economic reality" of the transaction, 36 the
decision does not reflect a complete analysis of the income tax ramifica-
tions. The Seventh Circuit stated that the only effect of the transaction
was to delay the tax until such time as the shareholder might sell its
stock in that the basis of the stock was reduced by the $10 million re-
turn of capital. 37 What the court did not consider was that the gain on
the disposition of the stock would be taxable as a long-term capital gain
at more favorable rates than the dividend, which is taxable as ordinary
income. 38 Furthermore, if the shareholder were to die owning the
stock, the gain would never be taxed since the basis would be stepped
31. 604 F.2d at 1050.
32. Id The taxpayer contended that pledging the partnership's stock to secure the corporate
debt was a common commercial practice used to eliminate the need for mortgages and U.C.C.
filings on the corporation's underlying assets.
33. Id
34. Id at 1050-51.
35. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
36. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
37. 604 F.2d at 1051.
38. I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1221-1223.
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up to the date of death (or alternate valuation date) value.39
The value of Falkoff as a guide in planning transactions is of
course limited to situations where a corporation without earnings and
profits can borrow money in anticipation of the sale of appreciated as-
sets. If the loan is not adequately secured by the assets of the corpora-
tion,40 a different result could very likely be reached by a court which
seeks to determine the economic substance of a transaction.
Taxation of Personal Service Corporation Income
The decision in Falkoff was based upon a determination of the
party for whose benefit a bank loan had been obtained. In another case
involving tax avoidance motivation, Foglesong v. Commissioner,41 the
Seventh Circuit decision was based upon a determination of which
party had earned certain income.
The issue in Foglesong was whether income of a corporation de-
rived from the personal services of its owner-employee should be taxed
to the owner-employee rather than to the corporation.4 2 The taxpayer
in Foglesong, a successful sales representative for two manufacturers of
steel tubing, incorporated his business in 1966. Consequently, of one
hundred shares of common stock outstanding, ninety-eight shares were
held by the taxpayer and one each were held by his wife and his ac-
countant. Preferred stock was issued to the taxpayer's minor children.
Following incorporation, at the taxpayer's request, commission checks
were made payable to the corporation. 43 Due to the effect of graduated
income tax rates, by incorporating and splitting the income among sev-
eral taxpayers the total amount of income tax payable would be re-
duced.
Three arguments are available to the Internal Revenue Service to
sustain a position that personal service income should be taxed to an
individual rather than to his corporation: (1) that the corporation is a
sham; (2) that the owner-employee assigned the income to the corpora-
tion;44 or (3) that an allocation is necessary under Code section 482. 45
39. I.R.C. § 1014. Carryover basis was repealed by the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 299 (1980).
40. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
41. 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980).
42. id at 865.
43. Id at 866.
44. See note 48 infra.
45. 621 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1980). Discretion is granted to the Secretary to allocate income
among commonly owned or controlled taxpayers "in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly
reflect. . . income .... " I.R.C. § 482.
TAXATION
Although the Tax Court in Foglesong 46 recognized the corporation
as a viable taxable entity,47 it concluded that the taxpayer's prime moti-
vation in incorporating was avoidance of taxes and that his control over
earning the income was sufficient to consider the income to be taxable
to him under the assignment of income theory of Lucas v. Earl.48 In
reaching this conclusion, the Tax Court considered the assignment of
income doctrine and the right of a taxpayer to arrange business affairs
so as to minimize taxes as inherently conflicting principles.
49
The Seventh Circuit, with one judge dissenting, reversed the Tax
Court on the assignment of income theory.50 Nevertheless, the case
was remanded to the Tax Court for a determination of the section 482
issue.
5i
In reversing the Tax Court on the assignment of income issue, the
Seventh Circuit stated that application of this doctrine would effec-
tively nullify the determination that the corporation was a viable taxa-
ble entity. 52 The Seventh Circuit emphasized the "policy of the law to
recognize corporations as economic actors except in exceptional cir-
cumstances" 53 and stated that the business purposes for forming a cor-
poration should not be weighed against tax avoidance motives "in
order to question the validity of a transaction purportedly entered into
by a corporation, rather than the validity of the corporation itself."
54
The Seventh Circuit distinguished the Foglesong case from Lucas
v. Earl55 where a taxpayer had assigned only his income. 56 The court
concluded that, unlike Lucas, Foglesong involved a novation of the
contracts with the manufacturers so that the corporation, and not the
taxpayer, was responsible for the performance of sales services and en-
titled to the income from those contracts.57 The Seventh Circuit analo-
gized the Foglesong facts to those in Fontaine Fox v. Commissioner,
58
46. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309 (1976).
47. Id at 1312. The corporation adopted bylaws, elected directors, conducted directors' and
shareholders' meetings and otherwise complied with all formalities required of corporations. 621
F.2d at 867.
48. 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Under this doctrine, a taxpayer who earns income is subject to tax
on that income notwithstanding that he may have assigned the right to receive that income to
somebody else.
49. 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1309, 1312 (1976).
50. 621 F.2d at 873.
51. Id
52. Id at 869.
53. Id at 872.
54. Id at 869.
55. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
56. 621 F.2d at 870.
57. Id
58. 37 B.T.A. 271 (1938).
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where a cartoonist transferred cartoon copyrights and service contracts
to his corporation. 59
Foglesong is a significant case from the perspective of providing
guidance for planning future transactions in that it sets forth guidelines
for limitation of the assignment of income doctrine. For purposes of
determining how to structure similar situations, it may be helpful to
note that in concluding that the income in Foglesong was taxable to the
corporation the Seventh Circuit looked to the following factors:60
I. That the corporation was responsible for performance of the
service contracts;
2. That the corporation was recognized as a viable, taxable entity;
3. That non-tax business purposes (obtaining limited liability and
expanding the business) were present;
4. That the corporation was not formed to take advantage of losses
of a separate business;
5. That the corporate form was recognized in business transac-
tions;6'
6. That the taxpayer rendered services only to the corporation;
62
7. That no law required the services to be performed by an individ-
ual rather than a corporation;
63
8. That the manufacturers which paid the income were not con-
trolled or dominated by the taxpayer, 64
9. That other, more appropriate legal bases existed for attacking the
transaction.
While the majority opinion in Foglesong presents a detailed analy-
sis of the legal principles underlying the assignment of income doctrine,
Justice Wood's dissenting opinion offers little analytical guidance. Jus-
tice Wood merely concluded that the tax avoidance motivation was
great enough to require finding against the taxpayer either under the
assignment of income reasoning of the Tax Court or as within the dis-
cretion of the Commissioner under section 482.65
Although the majority opinion was limited to the assignment of
income issue, if the case had been decided under section 482, the result
59. Id at 272-73.
60. 621 F.2d at 868-69.
61. The court distinguished Roubik v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 365 (1969), wherein four radi-
ologists disregarded the corporate form in their business transactions. 621 F.2d at 871.
62. The court distinguished American Savings Bank v. Commissioner. 56 T.C. 828 (1971),
where there was no formal employment relationship between the shareholders and the corpora-
tion. 621 F.2d at 871.
63. The court distinguished Jones v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1066 (1975), where federal law
required court reporting services to be performed by an individual and not a corporation. 621
F.2d at 872.
64. The court distinguished Rubin v. Commissioner. 51 T.C. 251 (1968), rev'd, 429 F.2d 650
(2d Cir. 1970). where the owner-employee of a personal service corporation also controlled the
company for which the services were to be performed. 621 F.2d at 870-71.
65. 621 F.2d at 873.
TAXATION
may very well have been different. The court, in rejecting the assign-
ment of income approach, stated that "[h]ere there are other -more pre-
cise devices for coping with the unacceptable tax avoidance which is
unquestionably present in this case. But there is no need to crack wal-
nuts with a sledge hammer."66
If the Tax Court on remand applies section 482 to allocate income
to the taxpayer, the tax benefits available through the use of personal
service corporations could be sharply curtailed. An allocation of in-
come to the shareholder-employee who performs the services would
eliminate the tax savings achieved by splitting the income among sev-
eral taxpayers. Even more significant would be the fact that if a corpo-
ration has no income, there can be no contribution to qualified
retirement plans. Without such qualified retirement plans there may be
little reason to incorporate a personal service business.
67
PRIORITY OF A FEDERAL TAX LIEN
Unlike Falkoff and Foglesong, tax avoidance was not an issue in
Sgro v. United States,6 wherein the Seventh Circuit decided that a fed-
eral tax lien had priority over a security agreement. The Sgro case
illustrates the need for obtaining adequate security where a note is re-
ceived in payment for shares-of a closely held corporation.
The taxpayer, the sole shareholder of a corporation, sold all his
stock in the corporation for cash and a note signed by both the purchas-
ers and the corporation. The note was secured by the assets of the cor-
poration, including accounts receivable. The taxpayer perfected his
lien by filing a financing statement in accordance with state require-
ments. Thereafter, the Internal Revenue Service assessed a deficiency
against the corporation for unpaid employment and withholding taxes
and filed a notice of a tax lien. To satisfy part of the deficiency, the
Internal Revenue Service levied upon accounts receivable of the corpo-
ration and seized cash in the corporation's safe and cash register. The
taxpayer brought suit to recover these amounts after the purchasers de-
faulted on their note.
69
The sole issue in Sgro was whether the security agreement granted
to the taxpayer to secure payment of the note was a "commercial tran-
66. Id at 872.
67. For a further analysis of the effect of Foglesong on personal service corporations, see
Burdett, Foglesong's Sec. 482 Approach May Threaten Closey-HeMd Personal Service Corporations,
53 J. TAX. 330 (1980).
68. 609 F.2d 1259 (7th CiT. 1979).
69. Id at 1262-63.
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sactions financing agreement" as defined in the Code. 70 If the security
agreement had met the definition, the taxpayer's lien would have had
priority over the federal tax lien.
71
In reversing the district court, 72 the Seventh Circuit concluded that
the statutory definition was not satisfied for two reasons. First, a com-
mercial transactions financing agreement must be "entered into by a
person in the course of his trade or business. ' 73 With regard to this
point, the Seventh Circuit noted that sale of stock is an investment ac-
tivity which is not a trade or business. 74 Second, the loan must be made
to a taxpayer "to be secured by commercial financing security acquired
by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of his trade or business. ' 75 Inas-
much as the loan was made to the purchasers of the stock, and not to
the corporation, the court concluded that it was not made to the "tax-
payer" as required by the statute.
76
The Seventh Circuit, which reached its decision by a technical
analysis of the statutory language, also noted that the congressional
purpose in enacting the "commercial transactions financing agree-
ment" rule was to protect creditors who rely upon inventory or ac-
counts receivable to secure their loans from recently filed tax liens.
77
The court stated that:
Because subsection (c)(2) advocates the general rule of first in time,
first in right, Congress narrowly defined its applicability to a specific
problem posed by the exigencies of Commerce. It chose not to ex-
tend protection to those whose engagement in the enumerated trans-
70. See I.R.C. § 6323(c)(2)(A), which defines a "commercial transactions financing agree-
ment" as follows:
(A) Definition.-The term "commercial transactions financing agreement" means an
agreement (entered into by a person in the course of his trade or business)-
(i) to make loans to the taxpayer to be secured by commercial financing security ac-
quired by the taxpayer in the course of his trade or business, or
(ii) to purchase commercial financing security (other than inventory) acquired by the
taxpayer in the ordinary course of his trade or business; but such an agreement shall be
treated as coming within the term only to the extent that such loan or purchase is made
before the 46th day after the date of tax lien filing or (if earlier) before the lender or
purchaser had actual notice or knowledge of such tax lien filing.
71. I.R.C. § 6323(c)(1)(A)(i) provides that a federal tax lien is not valid as against a security
interest arising after the filing of the federal tax lien if that security interest is pursuant to a "com-
mercial transactions financing agreement" entered into prior to the filing of the federal tax lien.
A lien on accounts receivable arising after the filing of a lien remains inchoate until the debt
becomes due. Therefore, the taxpayer's financing statement would have to qualify as a "commer-
cial transactions financing agreement" to have priority over the federal tax lien for accounts re-
ceivable becoming due after the tax lien filing.
72. Sgro v. United States, No. 76-0057 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1978).
73. I.R.C. § 6323(c)(2)(A).
74. 609 F.2d at 1264.
75. I.R.C. § 6323(c)(2)(A)(i).
76. 609 F.2d at 1264.
77. Id at 1265.
TAX.4TION
actions is not incident to their "trade or business" and to those who
extend loans to debtors other than the taxpayer.
78
The court went on to conclude that the Sgro transaction was not of the
type intended to be protected.
79
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966,80 a
federal tax lien had priority over all inchoate rights of others.8 1 Section
6323 of the Code now provides protection for those who take back a
security interest including inchoate interests under certain conditions.
8 2
As the decision in Sgro illustrates, however, a federal tax lien still has
priority over the inchoate rights of others where these conditions are
not satisfied. The Seventh Circuit will interpret strictly the legislative
language.
Thus, Sgro evidences the need for careful planning to have prior-
ity over a federal tax lien. In structuring the sale of shares of a closely
held corporation, the choate interests should be adequate to secure a
note given by the purchasers in payment for the shares where that note
is secured by assets of the corporation.
IMPUTED INTEREST ON SALE OF A PATENT
The Seventh Circuit also employed a strict interpretation of Code
language in deciding Ransburg Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner.
83
In that case, it affirmed a Tax Court decision that a portion of deferred
payments received by a corporation from the sale of patents constituted
interest.
84
The taxpayer, a corporation, sold certain patents to a Japanese
corporation in which it had a forty-nine per cent interest and received
payment therefor in installments over a period of several years.8 5 The
sales contract made no provision for interest on the deferred payments





80. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6326.
81. See W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENS (3d ed. 1972).
82. Eg., a commercial transactions financing agreement protects only security interests
which arise within 45 days after the federal tax lien is filed. I.R.C. § 6323(c)(2)(B). Therefore, an
accounts receivable financier should check for the existence of a federal tax lien once every 45
days in order to be protected.
83. 621 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1980).
84. Ransburg Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 271 (1979).
85. The taxpayer received a total of $5,178,677 during the years 1963 through 1972. 72 T.C.
at 274.
86. 621 F.2d at 265.
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Generally, a portion of deferred payments received from the sale
or exchange of property where some or all of the payments are due
more than one year following the sale or exchange will be deemed to be
interest where interest is not otherwise provided for.87 The Commis-
sioner, therefore, contended that a portion of the payments received by
the taxpayer in Ransburg constituted interest. 8 In agreeing with the
Commissioner, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an exception to the
general rule, which provides that no interest is imputed on payments
received "pursuant to a transfer described in Section 1235(a)," 89 was
inapplicable to the facts presented in Ransburg.90
The Seventh Circuit's decision is based upon a precise application
of statutory language. Code section 1235(a) provides for long-term
capital gain or loss treatment on the transfer of a patent "by any
holder."9' Inasmuch as a "holder" is defined in Code section 1235(b)
as excluding a corporation,92 the sale was not covered by section
1235(a) and the exception could not apply.
Although the gain in Ransburg did not qualify as a long-term capi-
tal gain under section 1235(a), it was, nonetheless, taxable as a long-
term capital gain in that the patent was found to be a capital asset.
93
The taxpayer had argued that the congressional intent was for the ex-
ception to apply to all sales of patents which resulted in capital gain,
and that the section 483(0(4) reference to "transfers described in Sec-
tion 1235(a). .. " did not require the definition in section 1235(b) to be
met.94 The Seventh Circuit, however, concluded that this position was
not supported by the legislative history. 95
It is possible that Congress overlooked the application of Code
section 483(0(4) to other capital gains from the sale of patents. None-
theless, where courts strictly interpret Code language, it appears that a
legislative amendment may be necessary to broaden its application.
Thus, for purposes of planning future transactions it should be noted
that, absent congressional action, interest probably will be imputed on
installment payments received by a corporation in payment for patents
which qualify as capital assets.
87. I.R.C. § 483.
88. 621 F.2d at 265-66.
89. I.R.C. § 483(f)(4).
90. 621 F.2d at 267.
91. I.R.C. § 1235(a).
92. See I.R.C. § 1235(b).
93. 621 F.2d at 265.
94. Id at 266.
95. Id at 268.
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TAX ON UNRELATED BUSINESS TAXABLE INCOME
Two cases decided by the Seventh Circuit between June 1, 1979
and May 31, 1980, Carle Foundation v. United States96 and Hope School
v. United States, 97 dealt with the question of whether an activity of an
otherwise tax-exempt organization 98 generated "unrelated business tax-
able income." 99 This question is important because unrelated business
taxable income is subject to income tax calculated in the same manner
as the tax on corporations. 100
Unrelated business taxable income is defined, with certain excep-
tions, as "gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated
trade or business . . . regularly carried on by it . . . ... '0 Although
both cases required a determination of whether the activity in question
generated "unrelated business taxable income," each case involved the
interpretation of a different section of the Code.'0 2 Since a major pur-
pose in enacting the tax on unrelated business taxable income was to
preclude tax-exempt organizations from having a competitive advan-
tage over taxable entities which engage in similar activities, 0 3 in each
case the Seventh Circuit considered as relevant whether the activity
caused the organization to have such a competitive advantage.
Carle Foundation involved a foundation complex whose facilities
were composed of a hospital and a pharmacy. Office space within the
complex was rented to a private medical clinic run by doctors engaged
96. 611 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1979).
97. 612 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1980).
98. See I.R.C. § 501. Certain types of entities enumerated in section 501 are exempt from
federal income taxes. The two cases reported by the Seventh Circuit involved entities which come
within the following classification of tax-exempt organization:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educa-
tional purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but
only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legis-
lation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in,
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
99. See text accompanying note 101 infra.
100. See I.R.C. § 511.
101. I.R.C. § 512(a).
102. Carle dealt with the relation of the activity to the tax-exempt purpose of the organization,
I.R.C. § 513(a), whereas Hope dealt with whether the proceeds were the product of a regularly
conducted trade or business, I.R.C. §§ 511, 512.
103. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1980), which states in part, "[t]he primary objective of
adoption of the unrelated business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by
placing the unrelated business activities of certain exempt organizations upon the same tax basis
as the non-exempt business endeavors with which they compete."
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in the practice of medicine for profit. Unlike the Carle Foundation, io4
the clinic was not a tax-exempt organization.
Although the Foundation facilities and the clinic were separate le-
gal entities, they shared many of the same services and facilities. The
Foundation hospital was staffed almost entirely by doctors from the
clinic, although those doctors were not employees of the hospital. In
addition, clinic patients requiring hospitalization generally were admit-
ted to the Foundation hospital. Furthermore, the pharmacy supplied
pharmaceuticals to the hospital as well as to the clinic and to some of
the clinic's patients. 0 5
The Internal Revenue Service contended that income from phar-
maceutical sales to the clinic and its private patients constituted taxable
income from a trade or business unrelated to the tax-exempt purposes
of the Foundation. 10 6 The Seventh Circuit, agreeing with the govern-
ment, reversed a contrary finding by the district court. 0 7
In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit methodically analyzed
the statutory requirements to determine whether the sales generated in-
come from a regularly operated business unrelated to the Foundation's
tax-exempt purpose. The Code, in pertinent part, defines "unrelated
trade or business" as:
[A]ny trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially re-
lated. . . to the exercise or performance by such organization of its
... purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption
under section 501 . . . except that such term does not include any
trade or business-which is carried on, in the case of an organization
described in section 501(c)(3) . . . by the organization primarily for
the convenience of its . . . patients .... 108
After deciding that prescription sales to the clinic and the clinic's
private patients were not primarily for the convenience of the Founda-
tion's patients,'0 9 the Seventh Circuit concluded that the sales were not
substantially related to the tax-exempt purposes of the Foundation as
set forth in an affidavit to the Internal Revenue Service at the time it
applied for tax-exempt status."10 This conclusion was based upon a
finding that the sales were in direct competition with non-exempt phar-
104. Hereinafter referred to as the Foundation.
105. 611 F.2d at 1193-94.
106. Id. at 1194.
107. Carle Foundation v. United States, No. 75-2-148 (E.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 1978).
108. I.R.C. § 513(a).
109. 611 F.2d at 1194-96. The determination was based upon an analysis of Rev. Rul. 68-376,
1968-2 C.B. 246, which contains examples of who is considered a patient within the meaning of
Code section 513(a)(2).
110. 611 F.2dat 1196.
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macies. ' I "
The Seventh Circuit considered the situation in Carle Foundation
to be similar to that in Revenue Ruling 68-375,1i E wherein a hospital
operated a pharmacy in an adjacent medical office building which it
owned and leased to some members of its medical staff. The Internal
Revenue Service ruled that the pharmacy, which was operated prima-
rily for the convenience of patients of doctors in the medical office
building, constituted an unrelated trade or business. The court noted
that in both situations, Revenue Ruling 68-375 and Carle Foundation,
pharmaceuticals were sold in connection with the purchaser visiting his
private physician rather than the use of hospital facilities."
3
The same panel which decided Carle Foundation in favor of the
government on November 29, 1979, decided Hope School against the
government on January 2, 1980, reversing the decision of the district
court. " 4 Unlike Carle Foundation, in Hope School it was conceded
that the activity was not related to the tax-exempt purposes of the or-
ganization.1 5 The issue, however, was whether the activity was a regu-
larly conducted trade or business."
16
The Hope School," 7 after unsuccessfully attempting to solicit con-
tributions, engaged a private company to send out packages of greeting
cards to prospective contributors, who were allowed to keep the cards
11. For 1971 and 1972, the years under consideration, pharmaceutical sales other than from
the exempt hospital and its patients were over $800,000, resulting in almost $150,000 of income.
611 F.2d at 1198.
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3) provides in pertinent part:
Where income is realized by an exempt organization from activities which are in part
related to the performance of its exempt functions, but which are conducted on a larger
scale than is reasonably necessary for performance of such functions, the gross income
attributable to that portion of the activities in excess of the needs of exempt functions
constitutes gross income from the conduct of unrelated trade or business.
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b), setting forth guidelines for what is an unrelated trade or business,
provides in pertinent part:
Activities or producing or distributing goods or performing services from which a partic-
ular amount of gross income is derived do not lose identity as trade or business merely
because they are carried on within a larger aggregate of similar activities or within a
larger complex of other endeavors which may, or may not, be related to the exempt
purposes of the organization. Thus, for example, the regular sale ofpharmaceutical sup-
plies to the generalpublic by a hospitalpharmacy does not lose identity as trade or business
merely because the pharmacy also furnishes supplies to the hospital and patients of the hos-
pital in accordance with its exempt purposes.
(Emphasis added).
112. 2 C.B. 245 (1968).
113. 611 F.2dat 1199.
114. Hope School v. United States, No. 79-1239 (S.D. I11. Jan. 2, 1980).
115. See 612 F.2d at 301.
116. See text accompanying note 101 supra. In Carle Foundation, it was conceded that the
pharmacy conducted a trade or business. 611 F.2d at 1194.
117. Hereinafter referred to as the School.
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at no charge. If no contribution was received, the greeting card com-
pany bore the economic loss. The greeting card company kept the first
$1.10 per package received from contributors and the balance was re-
tained by the School." 8 In assessing the tax on unrelated business tax-
able income, the Internal Revenue Service characterized the first $2.00
(or less) received per box as income and any amount in excess of $2.00
as a donation.119
In finding that the activity was not a regularly conducted trade or
business, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Internal Revenue Code
does not contain a definition of "trade or business" but that Treasury
Regulations and case law provide guidance. 20 The Seventh Circuit
then based its decision upon an application of the facts to a Treasury
Regulation which provides, in part:
On the other hand, where an activity does not possess the character-
istics of a trade or business. . . such as when an organization sends
out low cost articles incidental to the solicitation of charitable contri-
butions, the unrelated business income tax does not apply since the
organization is not in competition with taxable organizations.12
In the opinion of the Seventh Circuit, the solicitation activity did not
present an unfair competitive advantage and the greeting cards quali-
fied as low cost articles incidental to the solicitation of charitable con-
tributions. 122
Hope School offers little guidance as to when the "low cost arti-
cles" exception is applicable. As the Seventh Circuit noted, "[njo hard
and fast rule can be formulated to determine whether an activity falls
within the 'low cost articles' exception; rather, the facts must be viewed
as a whole, keeping in mind the congressional concern with unfair
competition." 
23
Carle Foundation, on the other hand, may provide somewhat more
guidance for application of the tax on unrelated business taxable in-
come to pharmaceutical sales by hospital pharmacies similarly situated.
Inasmuch as the key factor in such cases is undoubtedly whether the
activity is in direct competition with sales by non-exempt businesses,
the size and extent of pharmaceutical sales activities to customers other
than hospital patients will be of great importance in resolving the issue.
118. 612 F.2d at 300.
119. Id at 301.
120. Id
121. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (1980).
122. 612 F.2d at 304.
123. Id
TAXATION
TRUSTEE DISCRETION RESULTS IN PRIVATE FOUNDATION STATUS
The Seventh Circuit was called upon to decide a different issue
relating to tax-exempt organizations in Quarrie Charitable Fund v.
Commissioner.124 In affirming the Tax Court, 125 the Seventh Circuit
decided that the discretion of the trustee of the Quarrie Fund 126 to sub-
stitute beneficiaries caused the Fund to be classified as a private foun-
dation.
In an attempt to preclude tax abuse of family private founda-
tions, 127 the Tax Reform Act of 1969128 imposed substantial burdens
129
on tax-exempt organizations which are categorized as private founda-
tions.130 Excepted from the definition of a private foundation are cer-
tain types of public charities. ' 3' Similarly, supporting organizations of
public charities, defined as organizations which "[are] organized, and at
all times thereafter [are] operated, exclusively for the benefit of, to per-
form the functions of, or to carry out the purposes of one or more speci-
fied organizations described in paragraph (1) or (2) . . . 1132 are excepted
from private foundation status.133 The Fund claimed to be such'a sup-
porting organization.
The trustee of the Fund, a bank, was required by the trust agree-
ment to distribute Fund income to certain designated public charities.
The trustee, however, was granted the discretion to select other "chari-
table, scientific, educational or religious corporations, trusts, funds or
foundations" as beneficiaries in the event the stated charitable purposes
became "unnecessary, undesirable, impracticable, impossible, or no
longer adapted to the needs of the public . ... -134
According to Treasury Regulations, supporting organizations may
substitute a "publicly supported organization which is designed by
124. 603 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1979).
125. Quarrie Charitable Fund v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 182 (1978).
126. Hereinafter referred to as the Fund.
127. Donations to tax-exempt private foundations are, with certain limitations, deductible as
charitable contributions. I.R.C. § 170.
128. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
129. See I.R.C. §§ 4940-4945.
130. A private foundation is defined as any organization described in Code section 501(c)(3)
other than certain enumerated categories. I.R.C. § 509(a). For the definition of a section 501(c)(3)
organization, see note 98 supra.
131. I.R.C. § 509(a). Public charities were excepted inasmuch as exposure to public scrutiny
and dependence upon public support were considered sufficient to prevent abuse. See 603 F.2d at
1277.
132. I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) (emphasis added). The "specified organizations described in para-
graph (1) or (2)" are generally public charities.
133. I.R.C. § 509(a)(3).
134. 603 F.2d at 1277.
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class or purpose, rather than by name" for a designated organization
"but only if such substitution is conditioned upon the occurrence of an
event which is beyond the control of the supporting organization, such
as loss of exemption, substantial failure or abandonment of operations,
or dissolution of the publicly supported organization or organizations
designated in the articles .... ,"135 The Seventh Circuit held that the
trustee's discretion in Quarrie Charitable Fund exceeded the objective
standards set forth in the regulations for allowing a substitution of ben-
eficiaries. In the court's analysis, granting the trustee the subjective
power to substitute beneficiaries when the designated charitable use be-
comes "undesirable" did not create an objective standard which the
regulations would require.
136
Quarrie Charitable Fund illustrates the close scrutiny courts will
give to the powers of a trustee so as to accomplish the legislative intent
behind the Tax Reform Act of 1969137 in preventing tax abuse of pri-
vate foundations. The use of private foundations has been sharply cur-
tailed as a result of the changes brought about by the Act.'
38
Where trusts were established prior to the enactment of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, trustees may have felt unable to prevent the trust
from being deemed a private foundation. In Illinois, however, a trustee
is granted the power to amend the terms of the governing instrument to
preclude private foundation status. 139 As noted by the Seventh Circuit,
the trustee in Quarrie Charitable Fund was aware of this option and did
not pursue it. 140 The Seventh Circuit stated that the trustee who was
aware of this right and chose to ignore it attempted to retain more au-
thority than the statute and regulations would appear to allow. ' 4' One
can only speculate as to whether a different result would have been
reached if this option did not exist.
The holding in Quarrie Charitable Fund may cause banks and
other trustees to examine the discretion granted for substitution of ben-
eficiaries. Where that discretion exceeds the permitted powers outlined
in Treasury Regulations, that discretion should be limited so as to pre-
clude classification as a private foundation.
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(d)(4)(i)(a) (1980).
136. 603 F.2d at 1279.
137. See General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., Pub.
Law 91-172, prepared by the Staff of Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation 30 (Dec. 3,
1970).
138. See Worthy, The Tax Reform Act of 1969: Consequencesfor Private Foundations, 39 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB., Autumn, 1975, at 232.
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, § 51 (1979).
140. 603 F.2d at 1280-81.
141. Id at 1281.
TA XA TION
APPLICATION OF THE TAX BENEFIT RULE
Simply stated, under the tax benefit rule, if an amount deducted
from gross income is recovered in a later year, the recovery constitutes
income in the year of recovery. 42 Although the tax benefit rule, which
has been established through judicial precedent, 43 is not a difficult
concept, courts often have difficulty in its application. 44 This difficulty
is illustrated by the Seventh Circuit decision in Home Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Commissioner. 45 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit easily
applied the rule in First Trust and Savings Bank of Taylorville v. Com-
missioner,146 which illustrates the type of situation to which the tax
benefit rule is meant to be applied. Due to the rather limited applica-
tion of the facts of these cases, their value in structuring future transac-
tions is also limited. They are discussed here to reflect the approach of
the Seventh Circuit in handling such cases.
The facts in First Trust and Savings Bank of Taylorvile were not
complicated. Shareholders of incorporated banks located in Illinois
were subject to personal property tax on the value of their shares.
47
Banks customarily paid the tax on behalf of their shareholders. 148 Al-
though the tax on personal property owned by individuals was abol-
ished effective January 2, 1971, by an amendment to the Illinois
constitution, 149 a suit was filed questioning the validity of that amend-
ment. 50 Pending the outcome of the litigation, the Illinois legislature
required taxes to be deposited in an escrow account.15'
In 1972, the taxpayer bank paid the amount of personal property
tax on the value of its stock to the escrowee and deducted this amount
in calculating its taxable income. In 1973, the constitutional amend-
142. See, e.g., Block v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338 (1939), afl'dsub nom. Union Trust Co.
of Indianapolis v. Commissioner, Il1 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940); Alice
Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
143. It has also been codified as to certain situations. See I.R.C. § I I1.
144. Compare Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979) with Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d
837 (9th Cir. 1963).
145. Nos. 79-1602, 79-1603 (7th Cir. April 29, 1980).
146. 614 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1980).
147. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 557 (1979) (This provision has been repealed, effective
Dec. 31, 1982, by Pub. Act 81-1, 1st Special Sess. § I1).
148. This procedure was followed to satisfy a statutory requirement that banks retain sufficient
dividends to pay all personal property taxes assessable against their shares. See ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 120, § 558 (1979).
149. ILL. CONST. art. IX- § 5(c).
150. See note 148 supra.
151. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 676.01 (1979). (This provision has been repealed, effective
Dec. 31, 1982, by Pub. Act 81-1, 1st Special Sess. § 11).
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ment was held to be valid 5 2 and the taxes were refunded. The checks
were payable to the taxpayer and its shareholders jointly, and the tax-
payer endorsed the checks and forwarded them to its shareholders.
5 3
The Seventh Circuit, affirming the district court, 54 held that the
refund constituted income to the taxpayer under the tax benefit rule.
The taxpayer had contended that the refunded taxes should constitute
taxable income to the shareholders on whose behalf it originally paid
the taxes. Inasmuch as it was already obligated to endorse the refund
checks to its shareholders, the taxpayer took the position that it had not
"recovered" the taxes within the meaning of the tax benefit rule.' 55
The court, however, held that the taxpayer had, in fact, "recovered"
these amounts. The Seventh Circuit stated that the disposition of the
proceeds by the taxpayer did not determine whether there had been a
"recovery."1 56
As the court concluded, "[tlo allow the Bank a deduction for per-
sonal property taxes paid without subjecting it to income tax when its
payment is refunded is to produce precisely the sort of windfall which
the tax benefit rule is designed to preclude."' 57 This view was predi-
cated on the premise that an event which is inconsistent with a prior
deduction may require application of the tax benefit rule. ' 8
It is interesting to note that, unlike the analysis in Falkoff v. Com-
missioner,5 9 the Seventh Circuit here correctly analyzed the tax impli-
cations of its decision. The taxpayer argued that there would be no loss
of revenue to the government in that the shareholders were taxable on
the distribution from the taxpayer. The court correctly analyzed that
the distribution from the taxpayer constituted non-deductible corporate
dividends which were taxable to the shareholders. Therefore, there
would, in fact, have been a loss of revenue if the taxpayer's position
had been sustained. 1
60
In Home Mutual Insurance Co., the Seventh Circuit, affirming in
152. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973).
153. 614 F.2d at 1144.
154. First Trust & Sav. Bank of Taylorville v. Commissioner, No. 77-3110 (C.D. 111. May 3,
1979).
155. 614 F.2d at 1145. In Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Cullerton, 18 111. App. 3d 953, 958-59, 310
N.E.2d 845, 849 (1974), it was held that any personal property taxes which were refunded be-
longed to the shareholders regardless of who had actually paid them.
156. 614 F.2d at 1146.
157. Id.
158. Id
159. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
160. 614 F.2d at 1146-47.
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part and reversing and remanding in part the Tax Court,' 16 1 found the
tax benefit rule to be inapplicable. 162 Judge Pell, in his dissenting opin-
ion, on the other hand, felt that the case presented a classic example of
a situation in which the tax benefit rule should be applied. 1
63
The issue in Home Mutual Insurance Co. arose as a result of a
change in the method of taxing mutual fire and casualty insurance
companies. Commencing in 1963, underwriting income of such com-
panies became subject to tax. 164 In calculating underwriting income,
there is allowed a deduction for losses incurred in the taxable year,
which includes actual losses paid plus any increase or minus any de-
crease in unpaid losses outstanding during the year (as well as other
adjustments not relevant to the issue in this case). 65 The unpaid losses
outstanding account, a reserve for unsettled claims, is increased by the
estimated loss at the time a claim is made and is decreased by such
estimated amount at the time the claim is settled.
66
At the time the method of taxation was changed, the taxpayer, a
mutual casualty insurance company, established an estimated losses
outstanding account for claims unsettled at December 31, 1962.167
When actual experience proved this estimate to be too high, the tax-
payer claimed that the estimated losses outstanding account should be
adjusted downward to reflect the amount of actual losses.168 The effect
of overstating the estimated losses outstanding was to reduce the
amount of the losses incurred deduction, thereby increasing underwrit-
161. Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 944 (1978).
162. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court holding that a special transitory underwrit-
ing loss allowed by I.R.C. § 821(c) is to be deducted from underwriting gain less the protection-
against-loss deduction rather than from total underwriting gain. Nos. 79-1602, 79-1603, slip op. at
20-21 (7th Cir. April 29, 1980). This issue is unrelated to the application of the tax benefit rule and
will not be discussed in this article.
In finding the tax benefit rule to be inapplicable, the Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court
and denied the adjustment claimed by the taxpayer. See text accompanying notes 164-178 infra.
Following the decision by the three-judge panel, the case was reargued en banc. The full
court issued a subsequent opinion also finding against the taxpayer for the reasons stated in the
majority opinion of the three-judge panel. However, Judges Fairchild, Pell and Bauer dissented.
Nos. 79-1602, 79-1603 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 1980).
The taxpayers had argued, in the alternative, that the tax benefit rule would allow the tax-
payer to exclude cash salvage subrogation recoveries made on pre-1963 claims from computation
of the losses incurred deduction. This issue had not been decided by the Tax Court due to its
finding in favor of the taxpayer on other grounds. The case was therefore remanded to the Tax
Court for determination of this issue.
163. Id at 26-27.
164. See I.R.C. §§ 821-826.
165. I.R.C. § 832(b)(5); Treas. Reg. § 1.832-4(c) (1980).
166. I.R.C. § 832.
167. Nos. 79-1602, 79-1603, slip op. at 4 (7th Cir. April 29, 1980).
168. The losses outstanding account was overestimated by $402,314, which was 14.74% of the
original December 31, 1962 estimate of $2,729,746. Id
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ing income, for the year in which the claim was settled. 169
The Tax Court appears to have found in favor of the taxpayer
under the tax benefit rule although characterizing its decision as based
upon something other than the tax benefit rule. The December 3 1,
1962, unpaid losses outstanding, in the opinion of the Tax Court, did
not result in a tax benefit in that underwriting income was not subject
to tax before 1963 and, as the court observed, "[wie know of no case
which holds that the absence of a tax benefit in the prior year gives rise
to a [tax] deduction in the current year."' 70 The court concluded that
"although we have not identified our theory as the tax benefit rule,
when a casualty insurance company releases its excessive reserves, it
constitutes taxable income only to the extent that the amount released
consists of amounts previously deducted."' 71
The Tax Court decision was based, in part, on a determination
that the adjustment was analogous to a permitted retroactive adjust-
ment of inventory and also to a permitted adjustment of loss reserves of
a savings and loan association.' 72 The Seventh Circuit distinguished
both of these analogies and instead analogized the facts presented to
two life insurance tax cases in which it was held that the taxpayers
could not reduce beginning reserves to reflect actual experience where
the statutory language and legislative history precluded such an adjust-
ment.' 73 In each instance the reserve was estimated on the basis of
information known at that time. 174 An adjustment based upon a math-
ematical error apparently would have been acceptable. 
75
The Seventh Circuit also concluded that the tax benefit rule was
inapplicable. 176 The taxpayer had argued that the exclusionary aspect
of the tax benefit rule allowed the adjustment to be made. Under the
exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule, recovery of an item is ex-
cluded from income if it did not previously result in a tax benefit., 77 In
the opinion of the court, however, the exclusionary aspect of the tax
benefit rule cannot be applied unless the inclusionary aspect (i.e. inclu-
169. Nos. 79-1602, 79-1603, slip op. at 5 (7th Cir. April 29, 1980). For an illustration of the tax
effect of an overestimate see 70 T.C. 944, 947.
170. 70 T.C. at 953.
171. Id
172. Id at 950-51.
173. Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 602 F.2d 328 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 2154 (1980); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 118 (1967), ree'don other
grounds, 413 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1969).
174. See Nos. 79-1602, 79-1603, slip op. at 13 (7th Cir. April 29, 1980).
175. See id at 9.
176. Id at 14.
177. Id at 14-15.
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sion in income of the recovery of an item previously deducted) would
result in the inclusion of recoveries which, pursuant to the statute, are
not income.' 78 Because recoveries of overestimated liabilities are sub-
ject to tax as a result of the statutory language rather than application
of the tax benefit rule, the majority concluded that the case did not fall
within the scope of the tax benefit rule.
Judge Pell, on the other hand, in a less complicated dissenting
opinion, simply concluded "inasmuch as the taxpayer realized no real
economic gain from its payment of the claims made against its policies,
and it received no tax benefit from the excess accruals for unpaid losses
made prior to 1963, it should not be subjected to tax on its subsequent
recovery of these excess accruals. This is the essence of the long stand-
ing 'tax benefit rule!' ,179
Aside from illustrating the difficulty courts have in applying the
tax benefit rule, Home Mutual Insurance Co. is important to consider
when establishing reserves in the event of a change in the method of
taxation. The subsequent tax effect of either an overestimate or an un-
derestimate of a reserve account should be considered so as to mini-
mize the amount of federal tax liability.
CONCLUSION
A review of the tax cases decided by the Seventh Circuit is useful
not only for planning transactions involving the relatively few issues
and unique fact patterns present in those cases, but it is also helpful for
planning other transactions by providing insight as to the approach of
the court in deciding tax cases. For example, both Sgro and Ransburg
illustrate the approach of the court to interpret strictly the language of
the Code. In relying upon a specific Code provision to support a posi-
tion, all statutory requirements should be satisfied.
Where the resolution of an issue is dependent upon the application
of a unique fact pattern, the court may analyze the legislative intent in
enacting a particular statute or the reason for establishing a principle
by judicial precedent. This is evident from the decisions in Carle Foun-
dation and Hope School, where the Seventh Circuit analyzed the appli-
cation of the tax on unrelated business income in terms of whether the
178. Id The Seventh Circuit distinguished one case, American Financial Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 72 T.C. 506 (1979), in which the exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule was applied to
the treatment of salvage and reinsurance recoverable under I.R.C. § 832(b)(5), although there was
no assurance that recoveries would be taxed. The deduction in American Financial Corp. had not
resulted in a tax benefit due to certain net operating losses. Id at 18-19.
179. Id at 26-27.
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tax-exempt organizations had a competitive advantage over taxable en-
tities engaged in similar activities. The tax was enacted to preclude
such a competitive advantage and the legislative intent is set forth in
Treasury Regulations. Similarly, the court in Quarrie Charitable Fund
analyzed the fact pattern in terms of the abuses the private foundation
legislation was intended to prevent. Although the decision in Sgro was
based upon a technical analysis of the statutory language, the court did
note the legislative intent in enacting the federal tax lien priority stat-
ute. As these cases illustrate, it may be helpful to be familiar with the
legislative history of a particular statute in structuring a transaction
which is subject to varying interpretations. First Trust and Savings
Bank of Taylorville and Home Mutual Insurance Co. evidence the need
for understanding the reason for the court-established tax benefit rule.
The most interesting cases decided by the Seventh Circuit during
the period June 1, 1979 to May 31, 1980, were Falkoff and Foglesong.
Falkoff reflects the willingness of the court to approve creative tax
planning arrangements which can be supported as having some valid
business purpose other than tax avoidance. Foglesong has the most po-
tentially far-reaching application. Although the court did not decide
the section 482 issue, the language of both the majority and dissenting
opinions indicates that the result may have been different if it had been
called upon to decide that issue.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
ITT/CHICAGO KENT COLLEGE OF LAW
PUBLISHED BY THE STUDENTS OF
IIT/CHICAGO KENT COLLEGE OF LAW













Executive Notes and Comments Editor
MICHAEL J. COHEN
Notes and Comments Editor
IRWIN I. GZESH
Notes and Comments Editor
PATTY D. FERRAIOLO
Notes and Comments Editor
SUSAN HILLARY LOEB





































PROFESSOR JEFFREY SHERMAN, Facully Advisor
DEAN LEWIS M. COLLENS
MEMBER, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAW REVIEWS
lIT/Chicago Kent College of Law
assumes no responsibility for any statement appearing in the
columns of this publication.
VOLUME 57 1981 NUMBER 1

